Acheson's Speech to the Press Club, Jan. 12 1950

These words were spoken at the Press Club extemporaneously.

…I am frequently asked: Has the State Department got an Asian policy? And it seems to me that that discloses such a depth of ignorance that it is very hard to begin to deal with it. The peoples of Asia are so incredibly diverse and their problems are so incredibly diverse that how could anyone, even the most utter charlatan, believe that he had a uniform policy which would deal with all of them. On the other hand, there are very important similarities in ideas and in problems among the peoples of Asia and so what we come to, after we understand these diversities and these common attitudes of mind, is the fact that there must be certain similarities of approach, and there must be very great dissimilarities in action…

What was the Asia problem?  Why is that ignorant?  Give range of Asian country situations.  What was the "Asian attitudes of mind" or "Asian consciousness"?  What dissimilarities in action?

There is in this vast area what we might call a developing Asian consciousness, and a developing pattern, and this, I think, is based upon two factors…

One of these factors is a revulsion against the acceptance of misery and poverty as the normal condition of life. Throughout all of this vast area, you have that fundamental revolutionary aspect in mind and belief. The other common aspect that they have is the revulsion against foreign domination. Whether that foreign domination takes the form of colonialism or whether it takes the form of imperialism, they are through with it. They have had enough of it, and they want no more…

Colonialism and Imperialism (and what is the difference?) at the time in Asia.  What solutions were offered to Asians as means to "revolution"?  Who were their "foreign dominators"?  Examples spoken by Asians as to "having had enough of it."

Now, may I suggest to you that much of the bewilderment which has seized the minds of many of us about recent developments in China comes from a failure to understand this basic revolutionary force which is loose in Asia. The reasons for the fall of the Nationalist Government in china are preoccupying many people. All sorts of reasons have been attributed to it. Most commonly, it is said in various speeches and publications that it is the result of American bungling, that we are incompetent, that we did not understand, that American aid was too little, that we did the wrong things at the wrong time…Now, what I ask you to do is to stop looking for a moment under the bed and under the chair and under the rug to find out these reasons, but rather to look at the broad picture and see whether something doesn’t suggest itself…

China: recent developments.  Nationalists vs. CCP in Civil War history.  "Loss of China" criticism and who was criticized.  How much aid was given China (Nationalists)?  What is the "broad picture?

What has happened in my judgment is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government. There was really nothing to overthrow. They simply ignored it…They completely withdrew their support from this government, and when that support was withdrawn, the whole military establishment disintegrated. Added to the grossest incompetence every experienced by any military command was this total lack of support both in the armies and in the country, and so the whole matter just simply disintegrated.

Did the Chinese people really "simply ignore" and not "overthrow" the government?  Is that why it fell? simply because the people did not support it?  Did the people support the government before?  What does Acheson mean: military lack of support?

The communists did not create this. The Communists did not create this condition. They did not create this revolutionary spirit. They did not create a great force which moved out from under Chiang Kai-shek. But they were shrewd and cunning to mount it, to ride this thing into victory and into power…

(Rhetoric)

Now, let me come to another underlying and important factor which determines our relations and, in turn, our policy with the peoples of Asia. That is the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Asia, and particularly towards those parts of Asia which are contiguous to the Soviet Union, and with great particularity this afternoon, to north China.

Describe Soviet-Chinese relations and how this affected US policy with Asian countries.  Acheson mentions "north China".

The attitude and interest of the Russians in north China, and in these other areas as well, long antedates communism. This is not something that has come out of communism at all. It long antedates it. But the Communist regime has added new methods, new skills, and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. This Communistic concept and techniques have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration. Armed with these new powers, what is happening in China is that the Soviet Union is detaching the northern provinces [areas] of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete in Manchuria, and I am sure that in inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang there are very happy reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow. This is what is going on. It is the detachment of these whole areas, vast areas—populated by Chinese—the detachment of these areas from China and their attachment to the Soviet Union.

Pre-Red Russian expansionism/imperialism.  Narrate the detachment from China attachment to the USSR of these various regions.  Is this a concern for America?

I wish to state this and perhaps sin against my doctrine of nondogmatism, but I should like to suggest at any rate that this fact that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of any foreign power with Asia.

What does it mean for Acheson to have a doctrine of "nondogmatism"?  Is it really that significant?  How does it rate as compared with Korea or Vietnam?  Or Japan (trustee'd by America)?

What does that mean for us? It means something very, very significant. It means that nothing that we do and nothing that we say must be allowed to obscure the reality of this fact. All the efforts of propaganda will not be able to obscure it. The only thing that can obscure it is the folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part which easily could do so, and I urge all who are thinking about these foolish adventures to remember that we must not seize the unenviable position which the Russians have carved out for themselves. We must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves. We must take the position we have always taken—that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest. That, I suggest to you this afternoon, is the first and the great rule in regard to the formulation of American policy toward Asia.

What "foolish adventures"?  What specific "hatred" developing in the Chinese? and why MUST it develop?  Inform the China situation, where there is press to pay court to "China and China's integrity".  Does Acheson want China to think USSR China's "enemy".  Is that really the "first" rule regarding ALL asian policy?

I suggest that the second rule is very like the first. That is to keep our own purposes perfectly straight, perfectly pure, and perfectly aboveboard and do not get them mixed-up with legal quibbles or the attempt to do one thing and really achieve another…

What is he referring to?  "Legal" quibbles?

What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?

In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American—and there are Australia—troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there is not intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.

Threats to Japan.  What are the real requirements for Japanese security?  How many US and Australian troops?  

The defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

Map the perimeter.  History of the Ryukyus and what are their value and strategic importance?  Who are the population of the Ryukyus and how many?  What other UN (and otherwise) trustee relationships are going on at the time?  

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.

Recent events in the Phillipines and threats to the Phillipines.  History and why is America tied so well to the Phillipines.  

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.

What other areas could he possibly mean or could possibly look to this speech and find meaning about?  What does he mean "sensible or necassary within" and "practical relationship"?

Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other problems are not capable of solution through military means. These other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped military means.

Where could it come from?  Does he know and "hesitate to say" or can he not fathom?  Who could be attacked, by whom, and what chances would they have to resist?  What obligations are on the US in the various regions to help?  History of the UN as something for nations to lean on?  What "other problems" and how are they more important than military problems?  Why does he think they are "succeptible"? and what exactly is "subversion and penetration"?  Can they not be stopped by military means, examples?

The susceptibility to penetration arises because in many areas there are new governments which have little experience in governmental administration and have not become firmly established or perhaps firmly accepted in their countries. They grow, in part, from very serious economic problems…In part this susceptibility to penetration comes from the great social upheaval about which I have been speaking…

What new governments?  How little experience?  Does this make a difference?; contrast with a new government that CAN resist "subversion".  What "economic problems"?

So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitations, and which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside can decide for them.

Does America really want Asian peoples to be "on their own"? and could they ever allow this?  Describe colonialism in Asia.  What "help" does he mean to offer.  Does he really allow that it may "darken and drizzle out".  Is that in US policy?  Is in really "not" a decision an outside power can make? and does America believe that within its policy?